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In his theory of the republic, Plato conceived of the 
leader of a community as a wise philosopher-king, dedicating 
himself to the pursuit of the good of the community and the 
common interest.1  The American Revolution2 set itself against 
                                               
* Lecture given by Professor Wiessner at Lincoln Memorial 
University Duncan School of Law’s symposium “Navigating the 
Political Divide: Lesson from Lincoln,” held April 20, 2012 in 
Knoxville, TN.  The author is grateful for comments offered by 
Professors Michael Reisman and Keith Nunes as well as 
transcription and careful editing by his research assistant Alexandra 
Salvador and by Jeff Glaspie and his team at the LMU Law Review. 
Above all, he thanks Professor Sandra Ruffin, a long-time friend and 
former colleague at St. Thomas Law, for the honor of inviting him to 
this symposium.  One of a kind, Professor Ruffin was a 
distinguished scholar and teacher who reminded everyone of the 
task of law to build an order of human dignity which leaves nobody 
behind.  This essay is dedicated to her memory. 
** Professor of Law and Director, Graduate Program in Intercultural 
Human Rights, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, 
Florida. 
1  PLATO, THE REPUBLIC,  bk. V, at 153 (Allan Bloom trans., 2nd ed. 
1991). 
2  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1967); ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1789 (1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
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this idea of one benign, all-powerful monarch on the 
assumption that human beings cannot be seen as completely 
altruistic, committed to the well-being and the flourishing of 
others.  In particular, they saw clearly that men—and I assume 
women as well—are no angels3 and therefore governmental 
powers had to be, by necessity, divided so that the excessive 
ambition of one could be held in check by the ambition of 
others.4  Thus the construct of separating powers, both 
vertically5 and horizontally,6 and the particularly American 
principle of having nobody serve in two branches at the same 
time, i.e. the personal separation of powers—an idea 
unfamiliar to other modern democracies such as the United 
                                                                                                   
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992).  The ideals of its 
democratic revolution have become a model for the world.  GORDON 
S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY (2002); R.R. 
PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION. VOL. I:  THE 
CHALLENGE (1959). 
3 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (February 6, 1788), with 
its iconic language:  “If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.” See also GOTTFRIED 
DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST:  A CLASSIC OF FEDERALISM AND FREE 
GOVERNMENT (1960); DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE 
FEDERALIST (1984);  THE ENDURING FEDERALIST (Charles A. Beard ed., 
1948). 
4  Madison, supra note 3, “Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition.”   
5  Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An Architecture for Freedom, 1 NEW 
EUROPE L. REV. 129 (1992-1993); A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of 
Federalism, 1 NEW EUROPE L. REV. 143 (1992-1993); Victoria Nourse, 
The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 777 (1999).  Roots of 
the idea can be found in JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (1603) 
(Frederick S. Carney ed. & trans., 2013).  
6  Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, 
in his 1748 book DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS (translated 1750 into English as 
The Spirit of the Laws), urged that the political authority of the state be 
divided into separate and independent legislative, executive and 
judicial powers.  
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Kingdom where the Chief Executive, the Prime Minister, is 
also a member of Parliament.7  
On the other hand, the Constitution appears to 
recognize the need for a strong community response to threats 
—thus the grant of apparently undivided executive power, 
novel from the Articles of Confederation.8  While Congress’ 
power was enumerated in Article I, with whatever minor 
adjustments McCulloch and the necessary and proper clause 
wrought to it,9 the President was vested with “executive 
power” as declared in Article II.10  It is argued that therefore 
all executive action in the burgeoning welter of the modern 
administrative state derived ultimately from the President. 
The President also was accorded the original power of 
Commander-in-Chief,11 and the power to appoint members of 
his or her branch and also the judiciary.12  In order to acquit 
                                               
7  The requirement, by constitutional convention, that the Prime 
Minister be elected by Parliament, reduces the danger of gridlock 
more likely to be experienced in a presidential system, where both 
the head of the executive branch and all the members of the 
legislative branch enjoy direct democratic legitimacy conferred by 
the people. 
8  The Articles of Confederation of 1781 constituted a “firm league of 
friendship” amongst the thirteen seceding former British colonies 
(Article III).  Their institutional focus was on the legislature of the 
“united states, in Congress assembled” (e.g., Article IX), with the 
standing committee of this institution representing the closest 
analogue to an executive in the sense of a permanently sitting organ.   
9  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1:  “The executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.” 
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1:  “The President shall be Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 
Militia of the several States. …” 
12  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:  “He …  shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
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themselves of what they saw as their responsibility to the 
nation, Presidents since Lincoln and Roosevelt have asserted 
the power to control their branch by issuing commands from 
the White House directing departments and administrative 
agencies to pursue certain policies.  This original content of the 
theory of the “unitary executive,”13  advocated mainly at the 
end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, was 
arguably expanded to include broad powers in the field of 
national security14 resting more on an emergency rationale, 
rather than the idea of the President’s accountability for all the 
acts of his or her branch. 
Opponents of this idea of strong executive power, 
unbridled within the branch and far-reaching outside, were 
pointing to the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress to 
make all laws necessary to execute their legislative powers, 
including measures directed towards “departments.”  The 
Congress created departments and agencies with discretion, 
isolated from direct orders by the President or other members 
of the Executive Branch.  The motives were often respect for 
the subject-matter expertise of agency decision makers, who 
were in need of protection against overly political or partisan 
incursions (such as the Federal Reserve15), or required 
safeguards for their independence and impartiality to ensure 
the quality and fairness of quasi-judicial determinations (such 
                                                                                                   
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.” 
13  For a history of the idea from the beginnings of the Republic, see 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE.  PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).  
For a highly critical assessment, see JOHN P. MACKENZIE, ABSOLUTE 
POWER:  HOW THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY IS UNDERMINING THE 
CONSTITUTION (2008). 
14 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 18-19: “Most recently, the 
administration of George W. Bush has explicitly invoked the theory 
of the unitary executive as the basis for asserting sweeping implied 
emergency powers in waging the War on Terrorism.” 
15  Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 341 (1913). 
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as asylum decisions rendered by an immigration judge16).  As 
we will see, the Supreme Court respected these limits by 
allowing Congress to limit the President’s originally 
unrestrained removal power to cause, at least in cases of 
certain officials exercising quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
power. 
To properly delimit the scope of Presidential power, it 
would help to start with the structure, the architecture of the 
Constitution. The Executive Power is not the first one 
mentioned in this foundational document; in the sequence of 
the Constitution, it is listed after the powers of Congress, 
enumerated in Article I. That should tell us something. It 
reflects the judgment of the fathers of the Constitution that 
Congress is, or should be, pre-eminent in setting policy for the 
nation. The President has to “take care” that he or she 
implement the policy set by Congress; he or she has to 
faithfully execute it -- nota bene “faithfully.”17 He or she is not 
allowed to depart from the text and policy of a congressional 
statute; that is the original idea. For these reasons, I usually 
start my Constitutional Law class in Miami with McCulloch v. 
Maryland,18 not, as most other teachers and casebooks do, with 
Marbury v. Madison19—the former dealing with the range of 
                                               
16 “Immigration Judges are responsible for conducting Immigration 
Court proceedings and act independently in deciding matters before 
them. Immigration Judges are tasked with resolving cases in a 
manner that is timely, impartial, and consistent with the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, federal regulations, and precedent 
decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal appellate 
courts.” IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, last revised June 
10, 2013, ch. 1.2(a), at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ 
OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (last visited November 24, 2013).  
17  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3: “[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed. ...”  Even his oath of office includes this 
commitment: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States.” (U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 1, cl. 8, emphasis added). 
18  See supra note 9. 
19  5 U.S. 137 (1803).   
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express and implied powers of Congress, the latter with the 
authority of the Supreme Court.  
Now, Congress often does not live up to the exalted 
role that the founding fathers foresaw for it.  Part of the reason 
for it is that the Senate straight-jacketed itself with the 
requirement, not constitutionally mandated, of a super-
majority of sixty (60) votes to close debate and proceed to a 
vote on the merits of a bill, if a so-called filibuster is signaled.  
At a time of a nearly ubiquitous use of that instrument,20 a 
simple majority of fifty-one (51) is often no longer sufficient to 
have pieces of legislation approved by the Senate. The House 
of Representatives, on the other hand, still makes decisions by 
simple majority vote, so that institution should not have as 
much of a problem in reaching decisions and molding 
legislation.  Since, however, every enactment has to be to the 
comma the same in both houses, federal legislation is hard to 
achieve, especially when government is divided by political 
party and ideology. In addition, the various branches of 
government are not hermetically sealed from each other. There 
                                               
20 See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, 
Reforming a Broken Senate: Filibuster Reform, 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/policy/entry/filibuster-reform 
(last visited November 21, 2013):  “Some simple statistics highlight 
the present predicament.  From roughly 1920 to 1970, filibusters 
averaged one a year.  In stark contrast, in 2005-2006, there were an 
average of 34 cloture motions filed to end filibusters, and in the 2007-
08 Congress there were 139 cloture motions filed, roughly 70 a year.  
So far in the session (2009-2010), 132 cloture motions have been 
filed.” See also http://senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/ 
cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm (last visited November 21, 2013) 
for a year-by-year statistical chart tracking Senate cloture motions 
from 1917 to present;  See also Janet Hook & Kristina Peterson, 
Democrats Reign In Senate Filibusters, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21, 
2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023046
0710579211881413579404 on a November 21, 2013 Senate rule change 
which effectively ends the use of filibusters for executive branch 
appointments and most judicial branch appointments.  This so-called 
“nuclear option” will not affect filibusters of legislation or Supreme 
Court nominations.  
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are checks and balances between them. In the area of 
legislation, the President has a veto power.  Once a law has 
been passed, though, he or she owes the duty to faithfully 
execute Congress’ will. On the other hand, he or she has the 
original power of the Commander-in-Chief,21 the power to 
make treaties,22 and the power to appoint, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, and also to remove, officers of the 
United States.23 
The Federalist Papers do not talk much about the 
general nature of how this executive power should be 
interpreted. Alexander Hamilton, however, made the 
comment that “energy in the Executive is the leading 
characteristic in the definition of good government.”24 One 
would hope that any person who exercises governmental 
power be energetic, particularly one holding an office within 
the Executive Branch. Theodore Roosevelt has staked out the 
position of broad executive power in his theory of the 
stewardship of the country by the President.  He stated: 
[T]he executive power is limited only by 
specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing 
in the Constitution, or imposed by the Congress 
under its Constitutional powers. My view was 
that every executive officer, and above all every 
officer in high position, was a steward of the 
people bound actively and affirmatively to do 
all he could for the people, and not to content 
himself with the negative merit of keeping his 
talents undamaged in a napkin.  I declined to 
adopt the view that what was imperatively 
necessary for the Nation could not be done by 
                                               
21  See supra note 11. 
22  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:  “He shall have Power, by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided 
two thirds of the Senators present concur…” 
23  See supra note 12. 
24  THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (March 15, 1788). 
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the President unless he could find some specific 
authorization to do it. 25 
His successor, and his own Secretary of War, William Howard 
Taft, is cited for the opposite position:  
The President can exercise no power which 
cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some 
specific grant of power or justly implied and 
included within such express grant as proper 
and necessary to its exercise. There is, he said, 
no undefined residuum of power which he can 
exercise because it seems to him to be in the 
public interest.26  
These are two conflicting positions, and they have led to 
controversies over certain exercises of Presidential powers.  
Ultimately, they rest on the seemingly eternal conflict between 
an interpretation of the Constitution that relies virtually 
exclusively on its text and original meaning27 and the other 
reading which considers it a “living document.”28 
                                               
25 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 388-89 (1913). 
26  WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139-
140 ( 1916). 
27  For early formulations of this position, see Maurice Merrill, 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Obligation to Respect the Text, in 
PERSPECTIVES OF LAW:  ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT  260 
(Roscoe Pound et al. eds. 1964);  see also Justice Sutherland in Home 
Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-49, 453 (1934) 
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).  Justice Black summarizes:  “Our written 
Constitution means to me that where a power is not in terms granted 
or not necessary and proper to exercise a power granted, no such 
power exists in any branch of the government -- executive, 
legislative or judicial. Thus, it is language and history that are the 
crucial factors which influence me in interpreting the Constitution -- 
not reasonableness or desirability as determined by justices of the 
Supreme Court.”  HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 8 (1968).  
For today’s defense of the textualist position, see Justice ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (1997).  See also the video Scalia explains textualism, available at 
THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT  111 
 
II. THE DUTY TO FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE LAWS 
Let us address first the duty to faithfully execute the 
laws. Under this rule, the President may not simply refuse to 
execute the law or a decision of a court interpreting it. May I 
offer one example.  In Worcester v. Georgia,29 the Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice John Marshall upheld the validity of 
a treaty between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, 
which gave the latter rights to self-government over their 
lands in the State of Georgia.  Andrew Jackson, President at 
the time, supposedly said, “John Marshall has made his ruling, 
now let him enforce it.”30 Actually, Jackson had the military 
force to back him up, and, indeed, he failed to take any action 
to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision in this case.  What 
happened instead, in his Presidency, was the forced exodus of 
                                                                                                   
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FEKVXK61mew (last visited 
November 24, 2013). 
28  The idea is generally attributed to Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
statement in McCulloch v. Maryland:  "We must never forget that it is 
a constitution we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to 
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs."  See supra note 9, at 407.  Chief Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes amplified that the “power of ‘judicial review’ has given the 
Court a crucial responsibility in assuring individual rights, as well as 
in maintaining a ‘living Constitution’ whose broad provisions are 
continually applied to complicated new situations.” Supreme Court 
of the United States, The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, 
Charles Evans Hughes Cornerstone Address, at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last 
visited November 24, 2013). See also Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution 
as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); and William H. 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 
(1976).   
29  31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
30  CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 450, referencing JEAN EDWARD 
SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL:  DEFINER OF A NATION 516-18 (1996), who 
noted that Jackson “probably did not make that statement, at least 
not in that form,” and that he “had no duty to enforce that particular 
judgment at that point.” 
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Native Americans to Oklahoma, the tragic Trail of Tears31 – an 
area declared to be Indian territory forever, only to be turned 
over half a century later to new inhabitants of the later State of 
Oklahoma in the Land Run of 1889.32 President Obama went 
in a different policy direction when he, on December 16, 2010, 
declared the United States’ support33 for the 2007 U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,34 including 
rights to land and autonomy,35 reversing the Bush 
administration’s initial rejection of that declaration. Now there 
has not been an executive order or a Presidential directive, 
which would be binding and arguably within the President’s 
executive power, that would force the administrative agencies, 
like the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) or the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), to implement the Declaration. But I am 
                                               
31 Based on the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the Trail of Tears of the 
"Five Civilized Tribes" with its countless deaths, trauma and misery 
represented the nadir of the United States policy to remove Indians 
from the Eastern seaboard. See GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL:  
THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS (1953); see 
also ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN (1972).  
32 See KENNY A. FRANKS & PAUL F. LAMBERT, OKLAHOMA, THE LAND 
AND ITS PEOPLE 17-30 (1994); see also STAN HOIG, THE OKLAHOMA 
LAND RUSH OF 1889 (1989).  
33  For President Barack Obama’s declaration of support, see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/ 
remarks-president-white-house-tribal-nations-conference (last 
visited November 24, 2013). 
34 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
G.A. Res.61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/ 
DRIPS_en.pdf. 
35 According to the International Law Association’s Resolution No. 
5/2012 of August 30, 2012, the Declaration reflects customary 
international law rights of indigenous peoples to their cultural 
heritage, autonomy, and traditional lands.  For its text, see 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/ cid/1024; for 
background, see Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121-
140 (2011), available at http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/1/ 
121.full.pdf+ html (last visited November 24, 2013). 
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told that, at least now, Indian leaders feel much more welcome 
in the corridors of power. Prior to the President’s endorsement 
of the Declaration, Indian representatives may have been 
given a few minutes with a low-level employee of the BIA in 
Washington; now, I understand, they get one hour, 
courteously provided by the head of the agency. Things 
change. 
President Lincoln provided another example of a 
somewhat controversial use of executive power, when he 
interpreted the Constitution contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.36 Technically speaking, he 
was questioning the rule of law, at least in its formal sense. 
Although the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution itself, as 
interpreted by the Court, might have violated natural law, or 
what we think is right and decent, positivist lawyers could see 
his attitude as disrespect for the ruling of the Supreme Court 
which had to be obeyed whether one liked it or not. Later, on 
the other side of history, Southern governors refused to 
comply with Brown v. Board of Education,37 the command to 
desegregate. The Supreme Court did not take too kindly to 
that act of resistance. Arkansas’ Governor, Orval Faubus, had 
referred to his oath of office where he swore to abide by the 
Constitution; he maintained he would just interpret the 
Constitution differently than the Supreme Court and remain 
with the “separate, but equal” doctrine, then overruled, of 
Plessey v. Ferguson.38 The Supreme Court did not agree, 
reaffirming that it is its exclusive domain to say, with finality, 
what the Constitution means.39 Brown was now the supreme 
law of the land, to be observed by any other agent of 
                                               
36  60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
37  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
38 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
39  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that the Arkansas 
Governor and Legislature were bound by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution after state officials had failed 
to properly implement the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
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Government.40  Marbury had already held that it is 
“emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”41 The Supreme Court also 
reaffirmed against Congress its pre-eminence in interpreting 
the Constitution when it struck down the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, as applied to the states, in which Congress 
attempted to redefine the standard of review for the 
application of the Free Exercise Clause.42 
Controversy also surrounds a third issue of the 
exercise of presidential power, i.e. the increasing practice of 
the President to issue statements on the validity or 
interpretation of a law at the time of his signing it. Some of 
these “signing statements” had already been issued under 
President Clinton; they proliferated under President George 
W. Bush; and they continued under President Obama, though 
to a lesser degree; functionally, they may go back as far as 
President Monroe.43 These statements do not only provide for 
an interpretation of the law as seen from the President’s perch; 
they also include declarations of the law that he just signed as 
unconstitutional.44 Some of President Bush’s statements stood 
out as they “routinely asserted that he will not act contrary to 
the constitutional provisions that direct the president to 
                                               
40  Id. at 18. 
41  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).   
42  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
43 See The American Presidency Project, Presidential Signing 
Statements, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signingstatements. 
php (last visited November 22, 2013) for general information about 
presidential signing statements as well as a detailed database on 
signing statements issued by various Presidents. 
44 See President Bush’s signing statement regarding H.R. 2068 made 
on August 23, 2002 found at http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-
book2/html/PPP-2002-book2-doc-pg1471.htm (last visited 
November 22, 2013); see also Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies from President Obama on 
Presidential Signing Statements (March 9, 2009) found at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ Memorandum-on-
Presidential-Signing-Statements (last visited November 22, 2013). 
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‘supervise the unitary executive branch.’”45  A couple of times 
these statements merely reflected political differences because 
they go to the reach of the President’s war power or they 
introduce new reporting requirements to Congress, and so on. 
The President, in this case, just wants to maintain his position 
on an issue that has not yet been finally decided by the 
Supreme Court. In a second set of statements, President Bush 
has been clearly in the right. These include flagging a statute 
as unconstitutional when it includes provisions that provide a 
“legislative veto” held unconstitutional in Immigration & 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha46 and its progeny.47 That means 
that the executive implementation of a law cannot be made 
subject to the review, reconsideration and ultimate rejection by 
members of Congress, even individual committee chairs, or 
one house of Congress or both houses, and so on. That 
statutory reservation of power appears to plainly violate I.N.S. 
v. Chadha and established Supreme Court jurisprudence. As to 
the President, what would be the alternative to him? Could he 
veto that particular provision? This, again, would be 
unconstitutional as it would be equivalent to a line-item veto, 
declared unconstitutional in Clinton v. The City of New York.48 
So, if Congress decides to bundle everything on its legislative 
agenda into one statute, an omnibus bill, then the President 
has to either veto the entire legislation or let it pass in its 
entirety. In this regard, many of the states’ constitutions are 
probably much more preferable because they have allowed 
line-item vetoes.49  They also often include a single-subject 
requirement, disallowing the bundling, in one piece of 
                                               
45  Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 43. 
46 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
47  See President Bush’s statement cited supra in note 44. 
48 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
49 See Separation of Powers—Executive Veto Powers, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-executive-
veto-powers.aspx (last visited November 22, 2013) noting that 44 
states allow their executive the power of the line-item veto. 
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legislation, of all kinds of different issues (as in an “omnibus 
bill”).50 In the absence of such a constitutional provision on the 
federal level, what is the President to do?  An ABA Blue-
Ribbon Task Force has stated that signing statements denying 
the constitutionality and enforceability of certain provisions of 
non-vetoed legislation are highly problematic in light of the 
Constitution’s separation of powers and the rule of law.51  The 
legislative intent could not be determined out of a mix 
between what the Congress intended and the President 
intended.  The Congress, in Article I, is appointed to be the 
principal legislator; the President is encouraged to veto the 
law if he or she finds it unconstitutional or unwise. At this 
point, no single court has yet used signing statements as 
binding interpretations of a law, but the legality of 




III. THE EXPRESS POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO APPOINT AND 
REMOVE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES 
                                               
50 See Single Subject Rules, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/single-subject-rules.aspx (last visited November 22, 
2013) stating “41 states have constitutional provisions stipulating 
that bills may address only one subject, and several others have 
chamber rules for single-subject bills.” 
51 Press Release, American Bar Association, Blue-Ribbon Task Force 
Finds Bush’s Signing Statements Undermine Separation of Powers 
(July 24, 2006), available at http://archive.is/Z4V4y (last visited 
November 24, 2013).  See also Walter Dellinger, The Legal Significance 
of Presidential Signing Statements, Memorandum to Bernard N. 
Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, November 3, 1993, at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/signing.htm (last visited November 24, 
2013). 
52 Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference: Examining When 
Courts Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV.  869 (2007). 
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Beyond the obligation to faithfully executive the laws, 
which translates into a power derived from Congress, the 
President has original powers.  One of them is the power to 
nominate and remove officers of the United States.53 The logic 
is that the President has to have the authority to choose the 
members of his branch and to entrust the job of faithfully 
executing the law to them.54 If the President cannot trust them, 
he or she cannot perform his or her constitutional obligation; 
thus the argument for an unfettered power of removal under 
the theory of a unitary executive branch. At first, Congress 
approved allowing the President to remove, at will, the 
Secretaries of War, Foreign Affairs, and Treasury as seen fit by 
the President. Vice-President John Adams, in a famed decision 
of 1789, broke a 10 to 10 tie in the Senate in favor of the 
President’s power to fire the Secretary of the Treasury.55 
Subsequently, in September 1833, Andrew Jackson fired two 
Treasury Secretaries to appoint one who would agree with 
him and his command to terminate the Second Bank of the 
United States.56 That was a successful use of the claimed 
unfettered power. Later, President Nixon, fired attorney 
generals Elliot Richardson and William Ruckleshaus in 
sequence one Saturday night,57 when they would not remove 
special prosecutor Archibald Cox, appointed to investigate the 
Watergate affair.  This “Saturday Night Massacre” led to a 
                                               
53 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
54 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.  
55  JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION: 1789, at 217-18 
(1948); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 59, 445. 
56 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 105 et seq. See generally 
Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and The Federal Deficit: Form, 
Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 721-22 
(1987). 
57 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, 
Ruckelshaus Quit: President Abolishes Prosecutor’s Office; FBI Seals 
Records, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 1973), 
http://washingtonpost.com/politics/nixon-forces-firing-of-cox-
richardson-ruckelshaus-quit-president-abolishers-prosecutors-office-
fbi-seals-records/2012/06/04/gJQAFSR7IV_story.html (last visited 
November 22, 2013).  
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statute, the Ethics in Government Act, which we will address 
in a moment. 
The Supreme Court addressed this claimed 
presidential removal power first in Frank Myers v. United 
States.58 President Woodrow Wilson fired Frank Myers, a 
postmaster in Oregon despite the fact that he had a statutory 
four-year term, and his firing required Senate advice and 
consent. The Supreme Court in Myers decided that the 
President can fire any executive branch employee who 
performs only executive functions. That was the high point of 
the unitary executive theory. In Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.,59 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt fired the Senate-confirmed 
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, William E. 
Humphrey -- not for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office, as the act required, but because a rather 
business-oriented Mr. Humphrey would not go along with his 
views on the New Deal.60 The Supreme Court declared this 
firing unconstitutional. Independent agencies with quasi-
legislative and/or quasi-judicial functions can be created by 
Congress; and Congress can limit the Presidential removal 
power of officers performing these functions to cause. 
The last pertinent case is Morrison v. Olson.61 Ted Olson 
was the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of 
Legal Counsel who tangled with some House committees who 
investigated Superfund environmental clean-up law 
enforcement efforts and alleged his having committed 
criminal offenses in the process.  He was investigated by 
Alexia Morrison, a so-called independent counsel, the 
                                               
58 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
59 296 U.S. 602 (1935). 
60  CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 13, at 283-84.  The Court affirmed 
Humphrey’s Executor in the 1958 decision of Wiener v. United States, 
357 U.S. 349, which involved the removal of a member of the War 
Claims Commission – a body with judicial functions – even though 
the Congress had not specified the legitimate grounds for removal. 
61 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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functional equivalent of a special prosecutor appointed by a 
special division of the courts and subject only to removal for 
cause.  This unique form of appointment and removal was 
established through the Ethics in Government Act62 enacted in 
the wake of Watergate. Mr. Olson challenged the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel, stating that her 
appointment by the courts violated the principle of the 
separation of powers:  instead of the courts, the President 
should have appointed her. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
2 to 1, ruled for Olson.63 Judge Silverman confirmed the 
unitary executive branch idea. His position was that the power 
to appoint and remove persons from office must come from 
the same branch.64 You cannot have some other branch come 
in and appoint a person with such core executive functions as 
a prosecutor has.  The Supreme Court reversed in a 7 to 1 
decision.  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court that the 
federal courts can appoint inferior officers, as they qualified 
the independent counsel to be, and the Attorney General can 
still remove him, but only for good cause.65 So removal 
restrictions were extended even to officers that do not perform 
legislative or judicial functions, but also core executive 
functions such as investigation and prosecution. The only limit 
is for Congress to tie the hands of the President regarding 
removal if it impedes the President’s ability to perform his 
constitutional duty.66 That is a very broad standard.  
Thus, the pendulum swings back to Congress and the 
take-care clause;67 meaning that Congress may construct an 
office in a way that dictates the terms of appointment and 
removal of officials holding such office. I would, however, 
think that there could, and should, be a more limiting 
                                               
62 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1978). 
63 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
64  Id. at 481-82. 
65 Olson, 487 U.S. at 690.  
66  Id. at 691. 
67 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
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interpretation of this opinion, restricting it to its rather unique 
facts. This was a situation in which the executive branch itself 
could possibly only be credibly investigated by someone who 
gets appointed from the outside and does not work under the 
full authority and supervision of the Attorney General. So 
there could and should be, for this particular conflict of 
interest, the case of an exception to Myers. It would make 
eminent sense to consider Myers to still be in force for all other 
executive employees. 
 
IV. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
Executive privilege is another area of asserted 
executive power which we do not find in the text of the 
Constitution itself. The case of United States v. Nixon was 
concerned with a subpoena of certain documents and tapes 
which the President claimed were privileged.68 The President’s 
counsel argued that the Constitution grants an absolute 
privilege of confidentiality for all presidential 
communications. On the other hand, it was asserted that it is 
the judicial department’s role to say what the law is. The 
President claimed that communications between high 
government officials and advisors need to be protected, and 
that the executive branch needs to be kept independent, 
within its own sphere.  For these reasons, the President should 
be immune from being subpoenaed in an ongoing criminal 
prosecution. The Supreme Court shot that argument down, 
holding that there is no absolute unqualified presidential 
privilege of immunity from judicial process.69 It is not enough 
to state a broad and undifferentiated claim of a public interest 
in the confidentiality of presidential communications. The 
Court held what a President can claim as privileged are 
concretely identified military, diplomatic, or sensitive national 
                                               
68 See 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
69 Id. at 706. 
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security secrets.70 Furthermore, the Court stated that this type 
of information will be checked in chambers to verify that a 
claim of privilege is justified.71  
 
V. WAR AND EMERGENCY POWERS 
The last area of controversial exercises of power 
concerns executive authority in the case of war or other 
emergencies. At Lincoln Memorial University, it is appropriate 
to talk about the Civil War. During the war, Lincoln blockaded 
Southern ports after the secession of the states which formed 
the Confederacy.72 The suits challenging the proclamation of 
that blockade resulted in a decision by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Prize Cases of 1863, where, not 
surprisingly, Justice Grier for the Supreme Court stated that 
the President is the pre-eminent war-maker in his role as 
Commander-in-Chief, and that Congress has a very narrow 
veto power.73 The only dissenter, Justice Nelson, saw Congress 
as the primary war-maker, since they had the power to declare 
war and to raise monies for the Armies and to fund it.74  All 
the President had, in his view, was the power to repel sudden 
attacks.75   
The outcome of this case was a major victory for the 
President. This theory, however, came under heavy attack 
during the Vietnam War due to the high cost of error and 
misperceptions in international relations. This set the scene for 
great economic, physical, and emotional sacrifice for the 
                                               
70 Id. at 713. 
71 Id. at 711. 
72 For a concise historical account of Lincoln’s blockade of the South, 
see The Blockade of Confederate Ports, 1861-1865, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,  http://www.history.state.gov/ 
milestones/1861-1865/ blockade (last visited November 22, 2013). 
73 See 67 U.S. 635 (1862). 
74 Id. at 668. 
75 Id. at 691-92. 
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nation. As a result, the Congress determined that there need to 
be some deliberative process before the nation goes to war.  To 
that end, in 1973, the War Powers Resolution was enacted.76 
Congress overruled a Presidential veto of this resolution, and 
it became the War Powers Act which required an end to an 
armed conflict if certain conditions were fulfilled.77 All 
Presidents have rejected this resolution, and have not 
complied with all of its required procedures. The Court has 
not yet ruled on any attempts to clarify the reach of Congress’ 
war powers. 
In 1936, however, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Co. provided the Executive Branch with 
another strong victory in the field of foreign affairs.78  This 
case concerned the sale of arms to Bolivia in violation of a 
Presidential proclamation that prohibited this transaction.79 
Justice Sutherland said that the President alone has the power 
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation in the 
international arena. He alone negotiates treaties; the Congress 
and the Senate cannot invade that territory. The President is 
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations also in order to avoid embarrassment 
internationally. Congress’ legislation must often accord the 
President broad discretion, one not admissible when dealing 
with domestic affairs. The President has more information, he 
                                               
76 The War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973). 
77 For an overview of the historical background and detailed 
requirements of the War Powers Resolution, see War Powers, THE 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-
powers.php (last visited November 22, 2013).  
78 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
79 For the actual copy of the U.S. Senate report adopting a House 
Joint Resolution granting the President the power to impose an arms 





gis%7Cserialset%7C9770_s.rp.1153 (last visited November 22, 2013). 
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communicates secretly with other leaders and there is a 
longstanding tradition of broad delegation.  What now about 
the constitutional text? 
There are many foreign affairs powers allocated to 
Congress in the Constitution. For example, Congress may 
declare wars, raise armies, militias and navies, regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and so on.80 Still, the President 
is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the President 
negotiates treaties, even though he or she needs them to be 
approved in the Senate by a two-thirds majority.  In practice, 
this Presidential power has been ever more cabined by 
Congress by it becoming much more involved, particularly, in 
congressional-executive agreements, and in the Senate 
approval debate of treaties, where this body adds reservations, 
interpretations, and declarations of understanding.81  
The case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
decided in 1951, however, limits Presidential power in such 
important ways that it will forever be in all constitutional law 
textbooks.82 Youngstown involved a labor dispute in the steel 
industry where a strike was imminent. A few hours before the 
strike, President Truman issued Executive Order 10340, 
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession and 
                                               
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: “Congress shall have the power…To declare 
war…To raise and support Armies…To provide and maintain a 
Navy.” 
81 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1-2: “The President shall be commander 
in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States…[and] He shall 
have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to 
make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur…”.  For details, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN, MAHNOUSH H. 
ARSANJANI, SIEGFRIED WIESSNER & GAYL S. WESTERMAN,  
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (2004), at 1286 et 
seq. (re congressional-executive agreements), and 1320 et seq. (re 
reservations).  For an example, see the “declaration” in the Senate 
Report on the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights that the rights under this covenant are “not self-executing.” 
Id. at 1329. 
82 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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run most of the steel mills.83 The President argued this strike 
would jeopardize national defense because of the on-going 
Korean War. The Secretary issued possessory orders.  On 
April 30th the District Court enjoined the Secretary of 
Commerce from continuing the seizure and possession of the 
mills, and the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s 
decision. Cert was granted immediately on May 3rd, argued 
on May 12th, and the decision announced on June 2nd. The 
Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The 
plurality opinion was written by Justice Black, but he was 
practically alone in stating that the President’s power can only 
be derived from an act of Congress or from the Constitution 
itself.84 
The controlling law is difficult to discern. There is the 
opinion by Justice Frankfurter who advocated some theory of 
adverse possession of powers, which included a systematic, 
un-broken practice known to Congress and never before 
disapproved.85 Justice Jackson, another eminent jurist on the 
Court, started with the axiom that, in order to have a workable 
government, the two branches have to work together. If 
Congress opposed some action of the President, the President 
cannot do it. If it is at least to be implied, from the facts, that 
Congress agrees with the President, he can go ahead with his 
planned action. If there is silence, whichever branch acts first 
can do so under the doctrine of concurrent authority.86 In this 
case, Congress spoke first through the Taft-Hartley Act87 in 
                                               
83 To view the complete text of President Truman’s Executive Order, 
see The American Presidency Project, Executive Order 10340 – 
Directing the Secretary of Commerce to Take Possession of and Operate the 
Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel Companies, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78454 (last visited 
November 22, 2013). 
84  343 U.S. at 585. 
85  Id. at 610-11. 
86  Id. at 635 et seq. 
87 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 
(1947). 
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which it expressly rejected Presidential involvement in labor 
strikes. Stated simply, Congress said the President should not 
have the power to interfere in domestic labor disputes. An 
often overlooked but interesting fact is that there were three 
dissenters, led by Chief Justice Vinson, who said essentially 
that the President can make law in the presence of a national 
emergency.88 They were joined by two members of the 
majority, Justice Clark and Justice Burton, who were not 
disinclined to follow that line of reasoning, albeit in a much 
more restricted way. They formed what constitutes, in my 
view, the real holding of Youngstown.  Justice Clark stated that 
the President has broad authority in times of grave and 
imperative national emergency.89 The situation at hand, in his 
view, did not constitute such a compelling emergency at this 
time. Justice Burton agreed with this, finding that Congress 
had also specified procedures for this particular emergency, 
i.e. the Taft-Hartley Act, which excluded the measure of 
seizure. Therefore, despite Justices Jackson’s and Frankfurter’s 
opinions, the rule of Youngstown is that the President possesses 
special emergency powers in times of grave and imperative 
national threat. 
The Dames & Moore v. Regan decision in 1981 elevated 
Justice Jackson’s tripartite test to the test of the majority.90 This 
case interpreted an executive agreement that suspended 
private claims against Iran in the wake of the Mullahs’ 
takeover of Iran where American interests were harmed. This 
case arose from a deal negotiated by President Carter in 
Algiers the day before President Reagan took office. Under 
this agreement, the private claims that were pending in U.S. 
courts were to be suspended and then directed to arbitration 
                                               
88 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667 et seq. 
89 Id. at 662 (“In my view, the Constitution does grant to the 
President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative 
national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a grant may well be 
necessary to the very existence of the Constitution itself.”). 
90 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
126                                                      1 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2013)  
 
in a newly-constituted Iran-U.S. claims tribunal. Many such 
claims are still pending.  This suspension of claims and their 
subsequent arbitration was not one of the actions foreseen in 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act91 which 
Congress had enacted in 1977. The Executive Branch could 
nullify private claims, but it could not suspend them. 
However, Congress’ silence on the issue was looked upon by 
the Court as favoring Presidential power, and Congress did 
not really object to that kind of solution. The Court also 
referred to Justice Frankfurter’s idea that international 
settlements have been entered into in a systematic, unbroken 
way never before challenged by Congress and thus allowed 
this agreement to stand.   
Taken together, these decisions may confirm a 
presidential emergency power, but not an extra-constitutional 
one.  This is not like Germany during the Weimar Republic in 
1933 where President Hindenburg’s emergency powers 
allowed him to abrogate democratic freedoms and pave the 
way for Hitler to become the sole, pernicious leader of the 
nation.92 It is also not the type of powers found under the 1853 
Argentinian Constitution, which allowed many military 
dictatorships to live freely under the Constitution because 
they came into power under the pretext of responding to an 
emergency situation.93 That kind of extra-constitutional 
emergency power has been effectively rejected in the United 
                                               
91 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (1977). 
92 See generally Neil MacCormick, Jurisprudence, Democracy, and the 
Death of the Weimar Republic, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1095 (1999). The 
operative provision was Article 48 of the Constitution of the Weimar 
Republic. 
93 Carlos Rosenkrantz, Constitutional Emergencies in Argentina: The 
Romans (not the Judges) Have the Solution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1557, 1558 
(2011) (“The 1853 constitution allowed congress, in case of internal 
commotion, and the senate, in case of foreign attack, to declare a 
state of siege and to suspend individual rights provided that the 
constitution or authorities created thereby were in danger. From 
1854 until 2001, the state of siege was declared fifty-seven times.”). 
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States. Justice Jackson, in Youngstown, noted that “emergency 
powers tend to kindle emergencies.”94 The thought being, once 
one has that power written in the Constitution the powers that 
be tend to take advantage of it. The U.S. Constitution does not 
expressly confer such powers.  There was no discussion 
regarding such powers in the Constitutional Convention 
either.  This does not, however, exclude the fact that the need 
for such emergency powers exists. In fact, a Senate special 
committee established in 1972 found that, by then, Congress 
had enacted 470 statutes that grant the President emergency 
powers.95 I already mentioned the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, but there is also the National 
Emergency Act of 1976.96 They can be broadly interpreted, as 
we have seen in Dames & Moore, but the question is: can they 
be interpreted against the will of Congress? Probably not. In 
any event, they are only to be exercised in the face of grave 
and imperative national emergencies.  
There have been arguments that, especially in war 
time, there is no law, inter arma silent leges.97  This is no longer 
true, since we have the Lieber Code in the U.S.98 and the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
internationally.  They define what is allowable in times of war. 
The U.N. Charter and international practice also define when 
war can be started.99 There is an international crime of 
                                               
94 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650. 
95 CRS Report for Congress, National Emergency Powers, Harold C. 
Relyea Specialist in American National Government, Government 
Division, December 10, 1990, revised April 29, 1991, at http://usa-
the-republic.com/emergency%20powers/crs.html#/48.  
96 National Emergency Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1976). 
97 “In times of war, the law falls silent.”  For detailed discussion, see 
ROZA PATI, DUE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.  AN 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS 14 et seq. (2009). 
98 See Jordan J. Paust, Dr. Francis Lieber and the Lieber Code, 95 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 112 (2001). 
99 U.N. Charter art. 39-51 (self-defense and authorization by the UN 
Security Council).  There is also the apparent approval, under 
customary international law, of humanitarian intervention in cases 
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aggression that was just also defined for the International 
Criminal Court,100 and our Supreme Court did in fact use 
Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions when it 
decided the Hamdan case.101 Only a month later, the Military 
Commissions Act turned this around by declaring that all the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions are non-self-executing, 
and as a result cannot be used in U.S. courts.102 Beyond the 
concept of emergency powers, we have executive orders, and 
presidential directives.  These have the full force of law, but 
they need to rest within the original powers of the President or 
within the confines of legislation set by Congress.103 
 
VI.  APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION 
When we aim at determining the limits of executive 
powers, or any other legal issue within the structure of the 
Constitution, we ought to look at the problem from the 
perspective of the political opponent as well. That is, how 
would he or she use whatever power we ascribe to him or her? 
In particular, how could these powers be abused by a 
President of the other political persuasion? Second, the 
structure of decision-making should be seen in the context of 
achieving a public order of human dignity, for the function of 
                                                                                                   
of massive violation of fundamental human rights.  Myres S. 
McDougal & Siegfried Wiessner, Law and Minimum World Public 
Order, in MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR xix, lii (1994). 
100 The international crime of aggression was defined in Kampala, 
Uganda on June 11, 2010. Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court, The Crime of Aggression, at http://www.iccnow.org/ 
?mod=aggression (last visited November 24, 2013). 
101 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that the use of 
military tribunals to try Guantánamo Bay detainees violated 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions). 
102 The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-949 
(2006). 
103  John Contrubis, Executive Orders and Proclamations, CRS Report 
for Congress #95-722A, March 9, 1999, at 1-2. 
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all law is to serve human beings and not the other way 
around. We have to appraise the outcome, in terms of its 
consequences on human beings, of whatever constitutional 
structuring we have now and what we aim to have. Does it 
maximize access by all to all the things humans desire, 
humans want out of life? Does it pave the road for access to 
the processes of shaping and sharing of all the things humans 
strive to achieve in this great republic: power, wealth, 
affection, rectitude, enlightenment, skills, well-being, and 
respect?104 
In the area of the vertical separation of powers, 
commonly known as federalism, we see that its structure in 
our nation has for quite some time allowed for the exclusion of 
some people from the political process. But today, especially 
since President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, 
we can say, with good reason, that federalism is an 
“architecture for freedom”:105 its structuring allows decision-
making on the lowest possible level – close to maximum 
quality access to power for all.  Combined with the principle 
of subsidiarity, it empowers individuals. The question then is:  
is this also true for the principle of the horizontal separation of 
powers, i.e. the personal walls dividing the various branches 
of government? A similar yardstick should be applied here: do 
the legal consequences drawn from it fulfill the needs and 
                                               
104  Professor Myres McDougal has provided a most useful 
methodology to analyze a problem in this context and to resolve it.  It 
is outlined, in great detail, in his lecture The Application of Constitutive 
Prescriptions:  An Addendum to Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 135 
(1979).  His approach to law in general is problem- and policy-
oriented, and was developed in close collaboration with policy 
scientist Harold D. Lasswell.  Cf. Lasswell & McDougal’s two-volume 
treatise, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE 
FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992).  See 
also W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The 
New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575-582 
(2007). 
105  Wiessner, Federalism, supra note 5. 
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meet the aspirations of humans which the Constitution and all 
laws under it are supposed to serve?  The powers of the 
President in this context do have to face the same scrutiny as 
any other decision making body under our venerable 
Constitution. 
Does our constitutional system properly balance the 
interests of security and liberty? As a lawyer, you will be party 
to important decisions – in the courtroom, in legislatures, as 
advisor to, or even member of, the government. You should, 
as a law student, see yourself as one of the future leaders of 
the nation, as trustee of the community.  You know that the 
law of yesterday is not necessarily the law of tomorrow.  I 
recommend that you take a close look at yesterday’s laws, 
responses to the social problem they try to cure, and attempt 
to improve them in the interest of all.  While teaching practical 
legal skills is important, legal education has a broader calling.  
As public servant, you ought to try to understand and shape 
the law106 -- convince others that different arrangements might 
better achieve the goals of the flourishing of all. As to the 
President, we would not want to see him as a philosopher-
king, but it helps for him or her to have a good philosophy. 
                                               
106 Siegfried Wiessner, The New Haven School of Jurisprudence: A 
Universal Toolkit for Understanding and Shaping the Law, 18 ASIA 
PACIFIC L. REV. 45-61 (2010). 
